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Social distance in cooperation games: Examining the effect of 
conversation between players 
 
 
Abstract: Although traditional economic game theory relies on the assumption that 
players are rational and strictly self-interested, research shows behavioral and social 
factors contribute to people’s decision-making. This study investigates whether five 
minutes of conversation between two players who did not know each other prompts them 
to contribute more money to a shared account in a two-player cooperation game. In the 
game, public good is maximized if both players put everything in the shared account, but 
choosing to keep some money in a player’s personal account often results in higher 
personal gains. We hypothesized that conversation time would lead to decreased social 
distance and greater shared account contributions, but our results did not show a 
significant difference in the group of players that conversed before playing. While five 
minutes of conversation might not be enough to decrease social distance and inspire 
greater shared account contributions, we suggest further study to observe the effects of 
other, already established relationships. 
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Introduction 
 
Traditional economic theories assume individuals are “rational,” or completely self-
interested — that is, they will act to maximize their own gain. Game theory is no 
exception. Designed to predict the behavior of multiple players with interconnected 
actions and outcomes, game theory often relies on the supposition that all players are 
rational. But recent studies show that real people do not behave rationally in the lab. For 
example, in games where one player offers a lump sum to another, subjects show concern 
for fairness rather than simply vying for maximum personal gain. 1, 2, 3, 4  
  
An example of this is the ultimatum game, where a proposer and a responder bargain 
over a sum of money. The proposer offers a portion of the total to the responder, and the 
responder chooses to accept or reject the offer. If the responder accepts, he receives the 
offer and the proposer receives the remainder. But if the responder rejects the offer, both 
players receive nothing.  
  
To predict players’ behavior in dynamic games, game theorists use subgame perfection, 
which involves working backward to solve the game. In an ultimatum game, the subgame 
perfect equilibrium occurs when the proposer offers the smallest amount possible and the 
responder accepts. 3 In this situation, both players act completely out of self-interest. In 
practice, though, proposers most often offer around 40 or 50 percent of the total, even 
with substantial amounts at stake. 4, 8 Also, about half of the time responders refuse offers 
of less than 20 percent. 4 Experimenters interpret these results as evidence that responders 
feel slighted when they are not offered a “fair” or close-to-half amount and will refuse in 
order to “get back” at the proposer. Proposers, in turn, seem to anticipate this and will 
offer close to half to increase the chance of an accepted offer. 
  
In games with a public good consideration, researchers often explain human decisions 
through both private and social motivations. 7 Recent research also suggests that social, 
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behavioral and cognitive factors can contribute to an understanding of economic behavior 
that deviates from theory. 6 
  
These analyses show subjects do not behave rationally in the field. Thus, it is important 
to examine how people deviate from rational economic behavior and what brings changes 
in that behavior. Many insights have been made in recent years. How well players relate 
to each other, or the “social distance” between them, seems to play a role in their 
decision-making. When subjects in an ultimatum game know just the family name of the 
other player, their behavior changes little. 5 Personal communication and face-to-face 
bargaining between subjects, however, have both led to demonstrations of fairness. 2, 7 
Besides the fairness component in bargaining decisions, people seem to take into account 
a social norm, gravitating toward this norm when making and accepting offers. 1 
  
In this experiment, we examine the effects of increasing personal communication 
between players of a cooperation game. Our control group did not converse at all before 
playing the game, while the treatment group had five minutes of free conversation time 
prior to the game. In the game, players could choose to potentially maximize the overall 
gain for both players by putting all of their initial endowment into a shared account, or 
they could choose to keep some money in a personal account to ensure they would walk 
away with at least a little cash. Some related literature has explored social distance 
between players, but we found little research focusing on the amount of time spent 
decreasing that distance. In addition, many conclusions regarding concern for social 
distance or fairness developed from analysis of data alone, and without talking with 
subjects about their motivations. Thus, this experiment includes a survey of subjects’ 
reasoning to try and describe the why behind the behavior more accurately. 
 
Cooperation games, like the one we tested, are good models for situations such as court 
and legislative collaborations. In both the games and real-life negotiations, parties must 
decide how they will balance their private interests with the opportunity to maximize the 
public good. For example, the findings in this experiment apply to negotiations where 
legislators are deciding what to keep or remove from a bill, or where opponents are 
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bargaining to settle in a court case. By learning about the role of social distance in 
cooperative bargaining, legislators and lawyers can determine how to maximize 
compromise and accepted offers. 
  
Methods	  	  
 
Initially, we hoped to examine whether conversation would increase offers and 
acceptance rates in ultimatum games. To see how viable the experimental design would 
be, we ran control games with volunteer subjects from the University of Minnesota 
student community. After several games, however, each proposer had offered exactly half 
of the total $10 pot, and it was clear that there would likely not be enough variation in the 
control group to determine whether there was a difference in the treatment group. 
Although in this paper we do not offer any conclusive explanation for why the 50-50 split 
occurred in all pretesting cases, some of our participants suggested the outcome could be 
the result of a “Minnesota nice” factor or a consequence of both participants playing the 
game in the same room. We then decided to try the same conversation treatment but 
instead use a cooperation game with a public good component. The new game, we 
thought, would provide more variation in responses. 
 
In the game we chose, two players each begin with a $7 endowment. Each player must 
choose how much of that endowment to allocate to a personal account and how much to 
put into an account that is shared with the other player. After the players make the 
allocations without consulting each other, the experimenter increases the shared account 
by half. To calculate final earnings, each player gets half of the final shared account 
balance added to their personal account.  
 
If the players each decided to put all $7 into the shared account, they would maximize 
overall earnings. In that scenario, each player earns $10.50 and total earnings between the 
two players would be $21.  
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To maximize Player 1’s earnings, Player 1 would have to put $7 into her own account 
while Player 2 chose to put $7 into the shared account. In this scenario, Player 1 would 
earn $12.25, Player 2 would earn $5.25, and total earnings between the two players 
would be $17.50 — substantially less than the previous example.   
 
For the cooperation game, subjects were again chosen on a volunteer basis from the 
University of Minnesota student community. To recruit participants, we used the 
Department of Psychology’s Research Experience Program, which allows students to 
earn extra credit in psychology classes for participating in research.  Subjects earned two 
percentage points of extra credit for participating. Subjects also knew they could earn up 
to $12 based on the choices that they and another participant would make during the 
cooperation game. On average, subjects earned $9.14 during the half-hour experiment.  
 
Twenty pairs of subjects played the game, with varying amounts of free conversation 
time before the game to potentially decrease the social distance between players. A 
control group of ten pairs had no interaction before playing the game, and an 
experimental group of ten pairs had five minutes to interact before the game. Subjects in 
the treatment experiments were given a list of potential icebreaker questions to use during 
conversation time, including questions like, “What year in school are you?” and “What 
are you studying? Why?” Subjects were told they could discuss any topic. 
 
After conversation time, we explained the game to subjects, took questions and asked 
them to choose how much of their $7 they would allocate to each account. When they 
were finished, we wrote their choices on the board and calculated the shared account total 
and final earnings.  
 
Finally, all players completed a short survey after the game. The survey asked 
participants to rate how well they knew the other player before playing the game, explain 
how they made their decisions and share what they thought the other player was thinking. 
I hypothesized that the amount of money put into the shared account would increase with 
conversation time, because social distance between subjects would have decreased. 
6	   Tyler	  Gieseke	  &	  Terry	  Hurley	  	  	  
Table 1: Summary statistics	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Results	   
 
We found that treatment group subjects contributed $0.19 more to the shared account 
than the control group, on average. Based on the two groups’ standard deviations, the 
contributions from the treatment group were also less varied than those of the control 
group. But the median amount allocated to the shared account was exactly the same for 
the two groups. See Table 1 for a more complete description of the data, and Figure 1 for 
histograms.  
 
In our analysis, we first conducted a two-
sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. The null 
hypothesis in this test stated that the treatment 
and control group data were drawn from the 
same distribution, while the alternative 
hypothesis stated that the treatment group data 
came from a distribution greater than that of 
the control group data. We found that there 
was not enough evidence to conclude that the 
data came from different distributions  
(p-value=0.95). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Histograms showing the distribution of shared account contributions in the 
control and treatment groups. Participants in the treatment group gave no shared account 
contributions lower than $2.50. 
 Control Treatment 
Minimum 0.00 2.50 
First quartile 3.00 3.00 
Median 3.75 3.75 
Third quartile 5.13 5.00 
Maximum 7.00 7.00 
Mean  4.10 4.29 
Standard Deviation 1.89 1.40 
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In the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, it is impossible to compute an exact p-value when the 
data sets include some equal values, like ours do. But since the p-value was quite high, 
we do not feel that this affected our conclusion. 
 
We then performed a two-sample t-test, which assumes that the two samples come from 
normal distributions, to see whether the difference in the two groups’ means was 
statistically significant. We found that it was not (p-value=0.36).  
 
During the experiments, participants answered a survey question that asked them to rate 
how well they knew the other participant just before playing the cooperation game. The 
scale was 1 for “not at all” and 10 for “very well.” In the control group, all 16 responses 
were 1s (for four participants, these data were not collected). Responses in the treatment 
group ranged from 1 to 8, with an average of 3.2 and a median of 3.  
 
To further test what effect social distance might have on shared account contributions, we 
fitted a simple linear regression model with contribution as the response variable and the 
1-10 rating as the predictor. The multiple R-squared of 0.0015 does suggest a negligible 
positive correlation, but there is not enough evidence to conclude that the coefficient 
on rating is nonzero (p-value=0.83). Figure 2 shows a plot of contribution versus rating 
and the linear regression we fitted. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: A plot of 
shared account 
contribution and rating 
data. The line shows 
the simple linear 
regression. 
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Finally, a review of the survey responses suggested that most participants made their 
allocations based on a consideration of the best strategy to maximize their profit. 
Considerations for fairness and social distance were present, but they were few compared 
to those motivated by economic strategy. The results were similar for what players 
thought motivated their counterparts during the game. Most thought the other player 
made decisions based on a concern for what would maximize personal gain.        
	  
Discussion	  
 
The data we collected did not support our hypothesis that shared account contributions 
would increase with conversation time. However, we are not convinced that social 
distance plays no role in motivating a participant to willingly cooperate for the good of 
the group. While the treatment- and control-group means were not significantly different 
for conventional levels of significance, this could be attributable to several features of our 
experiment that could be improved in future work.	  	   
 
Firstly, this study examined twenty games, and twenty subjects in each of the data pools. 
This is a rather small data set, and it is possible that we would see statistically significant 
differences between groups if more participants were observed. Secondly, $7 is not an 
especially large sum to allocate. A difference between groups could appear if participants 
received a higher endowment to heighten the stakes. 
 
Finally, it is likely that five minutes of conversation time is not sufficient to decrease 
social distance to the point that each player trusts the other to put a large sum in the 
shared account. Perhaps, though, stronger relationships would affect those decisions. A 
future study could examine the decisions roommates make while playing the game, 
compared with the decisions of strangers.  
 
Although the samples studied here were small and from a specific population, our results 
suggest that quick, haphazard relationships are not strong enough to inspire cooperation. 
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